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Some interesting Facts about GSM
no authentication needed towards Mobile Stations (MS)
unencrypted air-links must always be supported by MS
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The victim is not registered with his home network
→ can not be called
The callee will not see the caller’s phone number
Not transparent






















HLR : Home Location Register
AUC : Authentication Center
VLR : Visitor Location Register
MSC : Mobile Switching Center
TRAU : Transcoder Rate Adapta-
tion Unit
BSC : Base Station Controller
BTS : Base Transceiver Station
MS : Mobile Station































































































We can do anything the victim could do without her having a
clue (untill her monthly phonebill arrives).
Dynamic cloning
Extras
1 Wiretapping (including incoming calls)
2 Call hijacking (impersonate the victim)
3 On the fly modification (e.g. of SMS)
4 Receive SMS on the victim’s behalf (think of mTAN)
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